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ARGUMENT 
Before proceeding to the merits of Appellee's (hereinafter 
"Freeport") arguments, Appellant (hereinafter "Enerco"), must 
address certain factual allegations made in the "Statement of the 
Case" in Freeport!s Brief. Enerco is troubled that it must use 
valuable space in its Brief to refute such "factual" allegations. 
In the Statement, and at other places in its Brief, Freeport 
refers to one of the thieves in question as "Enercofs employee." 
That is simply incorrect. That individual was provided by SOS 
Staffing Services, Inc., a licensed and well-known temporary 
service agency. He was SOS1 employee and was nothing more than a 
temporary independent contractor as to Enerco. 
Pages 3-7 of Freeport1s Brief make multiple incorrect factual 
allegations. Freeport alleges that it "has no control over the 
goods a tenant might choose to store in its leased premises." 
(Appellee's Brief, p. 3). This is directly contradictory to 
Paragraph 2 its own Lease Agreement which specifies what the Tenant 
can (and cannot) have in the building (R. 1266). Appellee's Brief 
states that Freeport cannot take a lien or security interest in 
Enercofs goods. This statement is not only unsupported, but is 
contrary to Utah law which clearly indicates that "Lessors shall 
have a lien for rent due upon all nonexempt property of the lessee 
brought or kept upon the leased premises" (U.C.A. 38-3-1). 
Freeport alleges in its Brief that it "has never undertaken to 
provide security for any tenant" and that "the buildings do not 
come equipped with security systems" (Appellee's Brief, p. 5). 
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This flies in the face of Freeportfs own promotional and 
advertising materials given to Enerco to induce it to become a 
tenant which represent, under the title "A Word About the Basics": 
Freeport is protected by five miles of 10 foot chain link 
fencing. Gates are manned or locked during hours of 
darkness. A roving security guard patrols the Center's 
735 fenced acres on weekends, at night, and on holidays. 
(R. 1403). The same materials clearly represent that "an 
electronic surveillance system connects each building with the 
Clearfield City Fire Department as well as the Freeport Center 
administrative offices and patrol vehicle." (Id.) 
The "support" for almost all of these improper allegations is 
an affidavit signed by Freeport's General Manager (R. 1254-59). 
When that affidavit was filed in the trial court, it was so rife 
with contradictory statements and made so many inappropriate legal 
conclusions that Enerco was forced to file a "Motion to Strike 
Portions of fSupplemental Affidavit of Stephen L. Barrett1." 
Unfortunately, the trial judge never ruled on that motion, and 
Freeport has continued to rely heavily on that improper affidavit 
as almost the sole support for its factual allegations. 
Freeport!s Brief also asserts, for the first time in this 
case, that in the Lease Agreement in question, Enerco "releases" 
its claims against Freeport and that the Agreement 
contemplates in Paragraph 18 that if Enerco1s property 
were stolen from the building it was renting, Enerco 
would indemnify Freeport for any liabilities . . . in 
connection with any theft of . . . goods . . . located on 
the premises. 
(Appellee!s Brief, pp. 4-5). The reason this argument has not 
previously been raised is that when the full language of Paragraph 
2 
18 is read, as opposed to the language Freeport has conveniently 
omitted in the quotation in its Brief, the inapplicability of the 
indemnification provisions in the Agreement becomes obvious: 
Tenant shall pay and shall indemnify and hold Landlord 
and its principals, employees and agents harmless from 
and against any and all liabilities . . . unless due to 
the negligence or wilful misconduct of Landlord, or its 
principals, employees or agents, in connection with any 
and all of the following: 
(b) any theft of or damage to or destruction of 
goods, wares, merchandise and all other property of 
Tenant or others located on the premises or arising from 
Tenant's use of the premises. 
(R. 1269, emphasis added). There are many other incorrect "facts" 
alleged in Freeportfs Brief but because of the page limitations of 
this Brief, Enerco now turns to Freeportfs legal arguments. 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REJECTED ENERCO1S 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
Freeport!s first error on this issue is that it attempts to 
artificially restrict Enerco!s breach of contract claims to the 
single Lease Agreement between the parties. Since the beginning of 
this case, Enerco has asserted that the contractual breaches extend 
far beyond that single document. 
In its final Amended Complaint, Enerco did not limit its 
breach of contract claims to the Lease Agreement (R. 854). When 
Freeport filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, Enerco filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition (R. 1353-1403) which also made it clear 
that the Lease Agreement was only part of Enerco' s breach of 
contract claim. That memorandum indicated that "James Kim was also 
given other materials at the time the lease was entered into and 
was also given verbal assurances and representations." (R. 1357). 
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Later, that memorandum also unequivocally stated that "Freeport 
also errs in trying to assert that the only agreements between the 
parties were contained in one written lease agreement" (R. 1364) 
and then explained: 
In addition to the express written agreements, there 
were multiple breaches of verbal contracts. As indicated 
above, plaintiff testified in his Answers to 
Interrogatories that: 
It was represented that security guards would 
protect the gates of the Freeport Center and 
that the security guards in addition to the 
other security measures set forth above would 
protect his property. Mr. Kim specifically 
remembers being told that "there is ample 
security here" and that his property would be 
safe, and that employees of Freeport had never 
heard of anyone stealing property from 
tenants. 
(R. 1368). Enerco testified in the above-referenced Answers to 
Interrogatories that other promises and contractual agreements were 
made. Enercofs President again so testified in his affidavit filed 
with the trial court (R. 1420-23). 
In its Appellantfs Brief, Enerco again made it clear that it 
was appealing not only the trial court's interpretation of the 
lease agreement, but also its finding that no other contractual 
breaches occurred. Enerco clearly listed one of the "Issues 
Presented for Review" as "[w]hether the trial court erred in 
refusing, as a matter of law, to look beyond the contract between 
the parties and consider the particular facts of this case . . . ." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 2). Enerco also argued that "evidence 
including Freeport!s sales brochures, verbal promises and other 
actions of Freeport's employees" should be considered in 
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determining whether the breach of contract claims were appropriate. 
(Appellantfs Brief, p. 27). While Freeport may wish to limit the 
contractual obligations to the Lease Agreement, doing so would 
ignore a great deal of relevant evidence and the relevant pleadings 
placed before both the trial court and this Court. 
The clear evidence before the trial court on this issue was 
largely uncontroverted, even in Mr. Barrett's affidavit. Freeport 
ignores the undisputed facts alleged in Enerco!s Brief that (1) at 
the time the lease was entered into, Freeport1s General Manager 
"gave Mr. Kim verbal assurances and representations regarding the 
security at the Freeport Center;" (2) he told Mr. Kim that "there 
would be security guards protecting the gate;" (3) he told Mr. Kim 
that "there is ample security here;" (4) he told Mr. Kim that 
"Enercofs property would be safe;" (5) Freeport gave Mr. Kim 
printed materials unequivocally promising ten foot chain link 
fencing, roving security guards, and an electronic surveillance 
system; (6) Enerco relied on all of these promises and materials in 
agreeing to lease from Freeport; (7) Freeportfs management took Mr. 
Kim's keys while he was out of town (while the thefts occurred) so 
that no one else could gain access to his warehouse; and (8) the 
thieves repeatedly drove load after load of Enercofs unique and 
highly-identifiable military equipment past Freeportfs guards on 
open flat bed trailers while the guards simply smiled and waved. 
When all of these facts, verbal promises and many written 
materials are also considered, especially in a light most favorable 
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to Enerco, it is clear that breaches of contract occurred. The 
trial court erred in not considering any of these undisputed facts. 
Freeport's Brief argues that all of this undisputed evidence 
should simply be ignored because of an integration clause in the 
Lease Agreement. First, even Freeport acknowledges in its Brief 
that such an integration clause is meaningless if ambiguities exist 
in the contract. Those ambiguities are discussed below. Second, 
the contract in question, which was signed on July 9, 1993 for a 
period of only six months (R. 1265) does not preclude subsequent 
agreements and verbal contracts being made, especially considering 
that the losses in question did not even occur until the end of 
1995. The promises, advertising, and actions of Freeportfs 
management continued right up to the time of the losses. 
Third, if Freeport is going to use the Lease Agreement as a 
shield and allege that it prevents consideration of all other 
evidence (as it successfully argued in the trial court), then it 
has the burden of showing the applicability of the Agreement on 
which it relies. Freeportfs Brief consistently refers only to a 
single Lease Agreement located at R. 1265-76. That Agreement only 
covers a period "beginning on the 1st day of August 1993, and 
ending on the 31st day of January, 1994." (R. 1265). 
From the dates and references to the record acknowledged in 
Freeport!s Brief, it appears that the trial court relied on an 
Agreement which was not even in effect at the time of the losses in 
question. Enerco represents to this Court that after a diligent 
search, Enerco does not believe that any subsequent agreements or 
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written contracts exist. Obviously, Freeport has never provided 
subsequent agreements to the trial court, or they would be part of 
this Courtfs record. According to the only Lease Agreement before 
the trial court or this Court, the written agreement ffend[ed] on 
the 31st day of January, 1994," almost two years before the losses 
in question occurred. 
If no written lease agreement existed after January 31, 1994, 
the question obviously becomes what did control the parties1 
relationship at the time of the losses. In Thomas J. Peck & Sons, 
Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446 
(1973), this Court explained what occurs when a lease agreement 
expires and the tenant retains possession and pays rent: 
the tenancy is not dependent on the terms of the invalid 
lease, but is implied by the law from the occupancy of 
the premises under an agreement, and . . . such a tenant 
cannot justly be treated as a trespasser. 
Id. at 192, emphasis added. This Court continued: 
The question then arises as to what are the rights of the 
parties under that type of landlord and tenant 
relationship. In the absence of an express agreement 
between them, the law necessarily implies that they will 
meet their obligations to each other on terms that are 
reasonable and fair to both. 
Id. This Court then held that under such facts: 
Some [courts] have ruled that a tenancy at will is 
created. But a greater number hold that the tenancy 
should be month to month, or year to year. A basic 
principle which seems to emerge from these cases is that 
even though the lease be invalid, its terms may be looked 
to and given some consideration, along with other 
factors, in arriving at what is fair and reasonable in 
adjustment of the rights of the parties. 
Id. at 192-93, emphasis added. As will be set forth in detail 
below, this "reasonableness" standard is exactly the same standard 
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which should also be applied in determining whether Enerco's claim 
for negligence is appropriate. 
In sum, all of the undisputed evidence of other oral 
contracts, representations and other documents should not be 
ignored in determining whether breaches of contract occurred simply 
because of an integration clause in a Lease Agreement which had 
ended long before the losses in question occurred. While the terms 
of that Agreement may be given "some consideration," they should 
only be considered "along with other factors" in determining 
whether promises and obligations were breached. Those "other 
factors" were improperly excluded by the trial court. 
Even if all of this additional evidence were ignored and only 
the Lease Agreement were considered, breaches of contract still 
exist for two reasons. First, Paragraph 15 of the Lease Agreement 
unequivocally required that "[i]f the demised premises or any part 
thereof shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty, 
Landlord shall promptly repair all such damage and restore the 
demised premises without expense to Tenant." (R. 1272). Theft and 
break-ins are certainly "casualties" as used in the Agreement. 
Unfortunately, Enercofs readily visible large delivery doors were 
not repaired "promptly," as it is undisputed they were kicked in 
and "left in pieces" for the perpetrators to gain access night 
after night over an extended period of time. That is what allowed 
such an extensive amount of property to be removed from the 
warehouse. Had Freeport really had "roving security guards" or 
"electronic surveillance systems" as promised, Freeport would have 
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seen the destroyed delivery doors. Freeport!s failure to "promptly 
repair" the doors was a breach of the Agreement. 
Enerco also believes that Freeport breached the Lease 
Agreement by refusing to allow Enerco to be covered for its losses 
under its insurance policy. (It must be emphasized that Freeport 
has never alleged that it did not have insurance coverage in place 
for the type of loss that occurred to Enerco — only that Enerco 
was not covered under Freeportfs policy). 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement clearly contemplates that 
Freeport would maintain insurance protection on the warehouse in 
question because the agreement instructed Enerco not to do anything 
"which would cause an increase in insurance premiums, render the 
insurance thereon void or cause cancellation thereof." (R. 1266, 
emphasis added). Likewise, paragraph 13(B) of the Lease Agreement 
even specified, to the penny, what the insurance premium would be, 
and required Enerco to contribute additional funds to pay the 
increased premium if the original premium exceeded that amount. 
(R. 1268). It is obvious that part of Enerco's rent was to pay the 
premium, and one must ask how Enerco can be required to pay premium 
increases, but not be an insured under the policy? 
In GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994), 
the Utah Court of Appeals explained that a tenant is a co-insured 
under its landlord's insurance policy: "The majority hold the 
landlord's insurance is presumed to be held for the tenant's 
benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an express agreement to 
the contrary." Id. at 1161, emphasis added. 
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Freeport argues in its Brief that Enerco was negligent in 
allowing the thefts to occur and that it should not have to 
"babysit" its Tenant. However, the GNS court explained: 
When the landlord agreed to provide insurance for the 
building it assumed the risk of its coinsured* s 
negligence. The insurer, which has accepted one premium 
covering the entire property and has assumed the risk of 
the negligence of each party, ought not to be allowed to 
shift the risk to any one of them. 
fid, at 1161, emphasis added). Enerco should not be required to 
pay premiums as part of its rent, pay the increases in premiums if 
they rise, and then be told it is not an insured. 
Nowhere in the Lease Agreement is it even suggested that the 
insurance in question will only cover "fire losses" as Freeport 
suggests. The Agreement only requires that the Tenant "pay any 
amount by which the property insurance premiums" exceed a specified 
amount. Utah law requires that a tenant is a co-insured of the 
landlord, especially when the tenant pays the premium. At a 
minimum, the language in the Agreement creates an ambiguity which 
must, as a matter of law, be construed against the landlord who 
prepared the document. The trial court improperly ruled that "the 
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by Enerco is inapplicable to 
the facts of this case" and that Freeport "had no contractual or 
common-law duty to provide that insurance to Enerco." (R. 1536). 
Even if the breach of contract claims were only limited to the 
Lease Agreement, Freeportfs failure to promptly repair the delivery 
doors and Freeport!s refusal to extend its insurance coverage to 
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Enerco breached its contractual duties. Ambiguities exist * 
(assuming the Agreement is even valid because of the January 31, 
1994 expiration date), and other evidence should be considered to 
determine what is "reasonable and fair" to the parties. 
When all of the other documents, acts of Freeportfs 
management, and verbal agreements made with Enerco are also 
considered (the existence and veracity of which Freeport does not 
even challenge in its Brief), there is no question that actionable 
breaches of contract occurred. The trial court should not have 
entered summary judgment against Enerco on that claim. 
POINT II. ENERCO IS NOT ASSERTING AN IMPLIED CONTRACT CLAIM 
As "Point II" of its Brief, Freeport claims that Enerco has 
attempted to "revive" the implied contract claim which Enerco 
voluntarily dismissed in the trial court. That is simply untrue. 
Enerco did not allege anywhere in its Brief that the implied 
contract claim should be considered by this Court. Rather, Enerco 
asserted that what Freeport refers to as "extrinsic evidence" must 
freeport1s Brief makes the incredible assertion that "Enerco 
freely admits the Lease Agreement is not ambiguous." For whatever 
reason, Freeport has apparently chosen to ignore the following 
clear language on page 27 of Enercofs Brief: 
The Lease Agreement's promises, including that insurance 
protection would be maintained on the warehouse in 
question and that Freeport would promptly repair all 
damages, create, at a minimum, ambiguities as to 
Freeport!s duties. Those ambiguities must be construed 
against Freeport because it drafted the Lease. Those 
ambiguities allow consideration of extrinsic evidence 
including Freeport!s sale brochures, verbal promises and 
other actions of Freeportfs employees. 
11 
be considered to determine what is fair and reasonable in relation 
to the parties' contractual duties and in determining what duties 
Freeport owed relative to Enerco's negligence claim. 
As indicated above, if the Lease Agreement is invalid (which 
certainly appears to be the case), then the "extrinsic evidence" 
which Freeport refers to must be considered to properly assess the 
breach of contract claim. Even if the effective dates of the 
Agreement are ignored and it is somehow valid, then the same 
evidence must be considered if any ambiguities exist. Finally, 
even if there were no breach of contract claim being made, this 
"extrinsic evidence" would have to be considered to determine what 
duties were created under the negligence claim. 
POINT III. ENERCO HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE 
As "Point III" of its Brief, Freeport makes what Enerco 
believes is its most critical error by blatantly making the 
erroneous assertion (as Point "A") that "[t]here is no general duty 
of a commercial landlord to furnish security to tenants." This 
assertion is directly contrary to the law of this State and almost 
every other court which has considered this important issue. 
The only Utah cases even mentioned as support are Eaton v. 
Savage, 28 Utah 2d 353, 502 P.2d 564 (1972) and Williams v. Melbv, 
99 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). Both of these cases support Enerco's 
position in this case. 
The Eaton case involved a 13 year old girl who sued the owners 
of an apartment building where she was injured while walking along 
a 15-inch high pipe railing used for the purpose of impeding foot 
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traffic across lawns. This Court simply held that "[a] possessor 
of land is liable to a trespassing child only if he fails to meet 
the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent man under the 
circumstances." Id. at 354. Even though the Eaton case has 
nothing to do with a commercial landlord-tenant relationship or the 
issues in this case, it does confirm the "reasonably prudent man" 
standard of care which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Likewise, the Williams case cited by Freeport is also 
inapplicable. In that case, the plaintiff sued the owner of her 
apartment complex after she fell through a closed window. 
In Williams, this Court began its analysis by noting that "a 
landlord is bound by the usual standard of exercising ordinary 
prudence and care" and that "he may be held liable for injuries 
caused by any defects . . . of which he was aware, and which he 
should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable 
risk of harm." Id., p. 726, n. 1, quoting Stephenson v. Warner, 
581 P. 2d 567, 568 (Utah 1978). This is obviously contrary to 
Freeportfs suggestion that landlords cannot be liable for their 
tenants1 injuries and damages. 
The Williams case also explained that "the common law duty of 
a landlord has been expanded in virtually every state . . . beyond 
the narrow common law categories" and that "the lessee!s rights, 
liabilities and expectations are more appropriately viewed as 
governed by contract and general principles of tort law." Id., 
pp. 726, 727. This Court then concluded that "[i]n the instant 
case, the landlord's duty was to use reasonable care." Id., p. 
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727, emphasis added. Again, this is completely contrary to 
Freeport's erroneous assertion that "the only common-law duty Utah 
courts have imposed upon landlords is the implied warranty of 
habitability." (Appellee's Brief, p. 20). 
Significantly, the Williams case also noted that fl[t]he care 
to be exercised in any particular case depends upon the 
circumstances of that case and on the extent of the foreseeable 
danger involved and must be determined as a question of fact." Id. 
The trial court erred in rejecting this claim as a matter of law. 
Finally, although discovery has not even been done yet to 
determine how many other thefts had occurred at the Freeport Center 
prior to these thefts, the Williams case made it clear that the 
frequency of prior acts has no bearing on the foreseeability of a 
future act: "The mere fact that a particular kind of accident has 
not happened before does not . . . show that such an accident is 
one which might not reasonably have been anticipated." Id../ p. 
728. This Court concluded in Williams that 
a trier of fact might find that the landlord should have 
known that a defective condition existed and should have 
taken precautions to avert the risk. Therefore, since we 
cannot hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff was 
equally or more negligent than [defendants], a triable 
issue of fact exists as to whether [defendants] breached 
their duty of care. 
Id-
As will be discussed below, Utah law has indicated that there 
is a duty for landlords to act reasonably and protect their clients 
in all circumstances. Because Utah law stands so contrary to 
Freeportfs position in this case, its Brief does not rely on Utah 
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law, but rather one case from California, Royal Neckwear Co., Inc. 
v. Century City, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1146 (1988), and one case 
from Arkansas, Bartlev v. Sweester, 890 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1994) to 
support the proposition that commercial landlords have no duty to 
protect their tenants. 
It is important for this Court to know just how much of a 
minority position those cases represent. After thoroughly 
researching this issue, it is Enercofs belief that these are the 
only two states which have reached this conclusion. Every other 
state which has addressed this issue, including Utah, has reached 
the exact opposite conclusion.2 
As indicated previously, this Court has "charged landlords 
with a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their tenants in all 
circumstances." Williams v. Melbv, supra at 726, emphasis added. 
This Court's own research confirmed that the common law duties of 
a landlord had been expanded "in virtually every state." Id. 
It appears that every state, with the exception of Arkansas 
(and possibly California to a limited extent, as explained above) 
have joined the overwhelming majority which holds that landlords do 
2In a case decided subsequent to the Royal Neckwear case cited 
by Freeport, even California appears to have recognized the 
"reasonable care" requirement. In Williams v. Saga Enterprises, 
Inc., 225 Cal. App. 3d 142 (1990), the California Court of Appeals 
considered a case brought by an injured passenger against a tavern 
owner. Interestingly (especially considering the fact that 
Freeport was in custody of Enercofs keys when the thefts took 
place), the plaintiff claimed that liability was created because 
the defendant had agreed to take custody of the driver's keys. The 
court indicated that this fact (taking custody of the driver's 
keys) was "sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to 
whether . . . Section 324 A of the Restatement [is] applicable to 
this case." Id., p. 907. 
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have a duty of reasonable care and that a landlord's tort liability 
to its tenant hinges on foreseeability. In Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), this Court unequivocally 
held that "the fact that the instrumentality which produced the 
injury . . . was the criminal conduct of a third person would not 
preclude a finding of proximate cause if the intervening agency was 
itself a foreseeable act." Id., p. 246. This Court explained that 
"it is foreseeable that an innkeeper's failure to maintain adequate 
security measures not only permits but may even encourage intruders 
to rob . . . hotel patrons." Id. 
In addition to the many out-of-state cases already cited by 
Enerco in its initial Brief, several other cases are important. In 
Hollev v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So.2d 98 (Fla. 
App. 1980), the Florida Court of Appeals rejected the defendant 
landlord's arguments, including its argument that "as a matter of 
law, it had no duty to provide protection against criminal 
conduct." id., p. 100. The Hollev court explained that because of 
"the foreseeability of . . . crime at its premises, a jury could 
properly find that a discharge of the landlord's duty to keep the 
common areas reasonably safe required that a guard or other 
security measures be provided" and also indicated that this was 
sufficient to create potential liability. Id., p. 99-100. 
Highly relevant to the present case is that the Hollev court 
found two facts which made the case "even more convincing." First, 
the court found that the landlord's practice of providing guards 
"constitutes an admissible indication of the defendant's own 
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knowledge of the risk and the precautions necessary to meet it." 
Id., p. 100, emphasis added (quoting W. Prosser# Law of Torts, §33 
at 168 (4th ed. 1971)). Second, that "the showing that part of 
[tenant's] rent may have been expressly for security creates a 
genuine issue concerning the landlord's contractual responsibility 
to provide that protection." Id. 
Exactly as Freeport has done in this case, the defendant in 
Hoilev claimed that "it would be economically unfeasible and 
practicably impossible to provide effective security for each 
tenant in its sprawling . . . project." Id., p. 100. The court 
rejected this argument, holding: 
This contention, which essentially concerns the balancing 
of the risks involved against the expenses required to 
obviate them, may appropriately be made only to the trier 
of fact. Under our system, it is peculiarly a jury 
function to determine what precautions are reasonably 
required in the exercise of a particular duty of due care 
[citation omitted]. That rule is plainly applicable to 
this situation. 
Id., pp. 100-01. 
In K.S.R. v. Novak & Sons, Inc., 406 N.W.2d 636 (Neb. 1987), 
the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a case in which, as in this 
case, a tenant!s door had been "kicked in" and not repaired by the 
landlord. Subsequently, a criminal entered through the door. 
The court first held that "a landlord has a duty to protect a 
tenant against the foreseeable acts of a third person" and then 
held that "a building owner who breaches such a duty may be held 
liable to an individual who is injured in a reasonably foreseeable 
criminal encounter that was proximately caused by the absence of 
adequate security." Id., p. 638, partially citing Waters v. New 
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York City Housing Authority, 513 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357, 505 N.E.2d 922, 
923 (1987). The court then concluded that "[q]uestions of 
foreseeability, negligence, and proximate cause are questions for 
the trier of fact." Id-/ P- 639. 
In Cain v. Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir. 1983), the 11th 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied Georgia law to a case in which a 
criminal had gained access to a tenant's room through a broken 
door. In reversing summary judgment which had been entered in 
favor of the landlord, the court ruled that if the criminal act was 
foreseeable, the landlord would be liable. The court then held: 
It is enough that by ordinary prudence the defendant 
could have foreseen that some injury or injurious 
consequence might have been anticipated from the act 
[numerous citations omitted]. A dangerous situation was 
created when the defendant failed to repair the broken 
locks . . . It would not take a very farsighted person 
to be able to imagine the possible consequences of such 
an action. However, this is not for the court to 
determine. Georgia courts have said numerous times that 
questions of negligence, proximate cause [and] 
foreseeability . . . are properly for a jury to 
determine. 
Id., p. 1283. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §449: 
"If the likelihood that a third person may act in a 
particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards 
which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether 
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal 
does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm 
caused thereby." 
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §302 B: 
"An act or omission may be negligent if the actor 
realizes or should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct 
of the other or a third person which is intended to cause 
harm, even though such conduct is criminal." (Emphasis 
added). 
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Freeport was able to convince the trial court that this 
overwhelming majority of case law and authority only applies to 
residential landlord cases. This was absolute error, as this Court 
has already applied these exact same standards to commercial cases 
(Mitchell, supra). and has clearly indicated that "this Court has 
charged landlords with a duty to exercise reasonable care in all 
circumstances." (Williams, supra at 726, emphasis added). Doing 
otherwise would not only reject the overwhelming majority of cases, 
but would create serious constitutional concerns including equal 
protection infringement and violations of Article I, Sections 7 and 
11 of the Constitution of Utah. Rather than burden this Court with 
another long list of cases, Enerco simply offers the following 
summary provided in an ALR3d annotation: 
Courts considering whether a landlord is under a 
duty to protect his tenants against criminal activities 
by third parties have made no express distinctions based 
upon the purpose—residential or commercial—to which the 
leased premises were devoted; and cases involving 
premises leased for commercial purposes ordinarily have 
been decided on the basis of the same considerations 
applied in cases dealing with residential property. 
43 ALR3d 331 at 363. 
The trial court erred in holding that Utah law and the vast 
majority of other states1 cases did not apply to Freeport because 
it is a commercial landlord. Enercofs cause of action for 
negligence is appropriate, and the issues of foreseeability and 
negligence are unquestionably issues for the jury to consider. 
Freeportfs final claim under this point is that even if there 
is a duty which extends to landlords, the dismissal of Enerco1s 
negligence claim would be appropriate because "the failure to 
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provide security was [not] a substantial causative factor leading 
to the thefts." (Appellee's Brief, pp. 22-3). This argument fails 
for three reasons. 
First, the trial court did not even consider this argument. 
Summary judgment on the negligence claim was granted solely on the 
trial court's erroneous ruling that "the landlord has no duty to 
protect tenants1 property from theft by third persons." (R. 1496.) 
Second, if the trial court would have considered this issue, 
it is unthinkable that the undisputed facts alleged by Enerco were 
not a "causative factor" in the losses. Failure to have roving 
security guards obviously contributed to allowing Enerco1 s delivery 
door to remained "left in pieces" for weeks and to allowing trucks 
and trailers to be driven into the warehouse in question. Failure 
to have an "electronic surveillance system," as promised, certainly 
contributed to the losses. Accepting James Kimfs keys to the 
warehouse so that no one else could gain entrance, and then smiling 
and waving to the thieves while more than 20 trailers of Enerco1s 
unique and readily-identifiable equipment were driven through the 
front gate certainly contributed to the losses. Inducing Enerco to 
become a tenant with undisputed verbal promises and written 
materials touting Freeport!s safety, security and lack of prior 
thefts certainly contributed to the losses. 
Perhaps this issue is moot because this Court has consistently 
held for decades that proximate cause is a question of fact for the 
jury. See, e.g., Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 457 (Utah 1981); 
Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P*2d 191 (1962). Even if the 
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trial court would have ruled on the issue of causation (which it 
did not), this issue would still need to go to the jury. 
POINT IV. FREEPORT QUALIFIED AS A WAREHOUSEMAN 
The obvious error made by Freeport in this section of its 
Brief is that it begins by asserting that "a warehouseman takes 
possession of another's goods under bailment." (Appellee's Brief, 
p. 25). The cases then cited by Freeport refer to bailment issues. 
Freeportfs only support for its assertion is a reference to U.C.A. 
70A-7-102(l)(a), which defines the term "Bailee": "'Bailee1 means 
the person who by a warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other 
document of title acknowledges possession of goods and contracts to 
deliver them." (Emphasis added). To the contrary, the very same 
statute separately defines the term "Warehouseman" as follows: 
"'Warehouseman1 is a person engaged in the business of storing 
goods for hire." (U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(h), emphasis added). 
Enerco does not believe there is any question Freeport is 
"engaged in the storing of goods for hire." Many of its buildings 
are used only for that very purpose. The term "goods" is defined 
as "all things which are treated as movable for the purposes of a 
contract of storage or transportation." (U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(f), 
emphasis added). 
Using the definition of a "bailee" (which under U.C.A. 70A-7-
102(1)(a) must have a "warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other 
document of title acknowledging possession of goods"), Freeport 
erroneously argues that one cannot be a warehouseman unless it 
takes possession of goods through a warehouse receipt or other 
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document of title. Treatises and courts across the country have 
held just the opposite. A leading UCC treatise, Anderson on the 
Uniform Commercial Code, summarized that 
A warehouseman is "a person engaged in the business of 
storing goods for hire." It is to be noted that neither 
the issuing of a receipt nor the storing in a building of 
the warehouseman is an element of the definition. 
Id. at §7-102:4, emphasis added. In Butler Mfg. Co. v. Americold 
Corp., 835 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Kansas 1993), the plaintiff sued the 
owner of a storage facility for damages done to the plaintiff's 
property. The property being stored was not something the landlord 
was going to re-sell, but was only the tenant's business records. 
Their agreements were "storage contracts." In rejecting the same 
argument Freeport has made, the court held: 
The records clearly fall under the UCC's definition of 
goods, which are defined under K.S.A. 84-7-102(1)(f) 
[identical to Utah's U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(f)] as including 
"all things which are treated as movable for the purposes 
of a contract of storage or transportation." The court 
finds that the defendants in this consolidated action 
clearly are warehousemen as defined by K.S.A. 84-7-
102(l)(h) [identical to U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(h)]. One 
need only look at the provisions in the contracts to see 
that the defendants were engaged in the business of 
storing goods (the records) for hire (plaintiffs were 
paving them for storage). It is true that defendants did 
not issue documents specifically entitled "warehouse 
receipts" regarding the records, however, that is not 
material in the determination of whether defendants are 
warehousemen as defined by the UCC. [Citations omitted]. 
If the drafters of Article 7 had wished to limit the 
application of its provisions to situations in which 
documents specifically entitled warehouse receipts were 
issued, they could easily have done so. 
Id. at 1279, emphasis added. The court then granted summary 
judgment for the plaintiff. See also Indemnity Marine Assurance 
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Co. v, Lipin Robinson Warehouse Corp., 99 Mich. App. 6, 297 N.W.2d 
846 (1980): 
The issuance or warehouse receipts or other 
documents of title by Lipin Robinson is not, in any 
event, critical to a finding that Article 7 of the UCC 
applies. While most of the provisions of Article 7 
specifically deal with such documents, they are not 
mentioned in every provision. It is undeniable that 
Lipin Robinson is a "warehouseman" . . . . Unlike other 
major articles of the code, Article 7 does not include 
one basic provision outlining its scope. 
Id. at 850, emphasis in original. 
Freeport's claim that it had no right to take control of 
plaintiff's goods is irrelevant. An entity "in the business of 
storing goods for hire" may be a warehouseman and not be entitled 
to a warehouseman's lien if it does not have a warehouse receipt or 
other document of title: "Once qualified as a warehouseman, in 
order to acquire a lien the warehouseman must issue a document 
known as a warehouse receipt." In re Celotex, 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 
482, 485 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct., MD Fla. 1991), emphasis added. 
Freeport's standing as a warehouseman is important because 
U.C.A. 70A-7-204(l) mandates that "a warehouseman is liable for 
damages for loss of or injury to goods caused by his failure to 
exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably careful man 
would exercise under like circumstances." Interestingly, this duty 
is the same as a landlord must exercise. Furthermore, UCC cases 
have the same requirements as landlord cases in that whether the 
standard was breached (and whether proximate cause exists) is left 
to the jury. See, e.g., W.A. Taylor & Co. v. Griswold & Bateman 
Warehouse Co., 754 F. Supp. 1260 (N„D. Illinois 1990); United 
23 
States Borax and Chemical Co. v. Blackhawk Warehousing and Leasing 
Cg^, 586 S.W.2d 249 (Ark. App. 1979). The trial court erred in 
ruling that the UCC did not apply to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. All the evidence must be evaluated in a light 
most favorable to Enerco, and any doubt or uncertainty must be 
resolved in its favor. When cases involve negligence, summary 
judgment is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case. 
Utah law mandates that Landlords have duties to exercise 
reasonable care "in all circumstances." This Court has 
unequivocally held that with regard to landlord cases, the care to 
be exercised in any particular case depends on the circumstances of 
that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved, and 
must be determined as a question of fact. Furthermore, as 
explained in Enerco!s initial Brief, Freeport's general duty in 
this case was increased by the fact that it actually undertook to 
render security services by providing guards at the gate, roving 
security guards, etc. 
Utah law requires that "the landlord's insurance is presumed 
to be held for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence 
of an express agreement to the contrary." No such agreement to the 
contrary exists and it is undisputed that Enerco paid the premiums. 
Freeport owed Enerco the duties of a warehouseman, and is 
statutorily liable for the loss of Enercofs goods. There is no 
24 
evidence that Enerco is a "bailee" as asserted by Freeport. 
The only Lease Agreement considered by the trial court (or 
before this Court) is invalid according to its own terms. 
Therefore, other evidence of contractual obligations must be 
considered. Even if the Lease Agreement were valid, multiple 
ambiguities exist which would also require the consideration of the 
other, undisputed evidence referenced above. Freeport!s acts and 
omissions set forth herein breached the agreements between the 
parties, and any ambiguities must be construed against Freeport. 
For all of these reasons, Enerco submits that the trial court 
erred and respectfully requests that the judgment entered in favor 
of Freeport be reversed as set forth herein. 
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